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Abstract
The transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms in a network econ-
omy is investigated with an abstract stochastic model. The model de-
scribes the profit which firms make when they sell materials to a firm
which produces a product and the fixed cost expense to the firms to pro-
duce those materials and product. The formulae for this model are parallel
to those for population dynamics. The swinging changes in the fluctuation
in the transient state from the initial growth to the final steady state are
the consequence of a topology-dependent time trial competition between
the profitable interactions and expense. The firm in a sparse random net-
work economy is more likely to go bankrupt than expected from the value
of the limit of the fluctuation in the steady state, and there is a risk of
failing to reach by far the less fluctuating steady state.
1 Introduction
Firms are put under the selection pressure in a network economy. Every firm
searches for the most profitable pattern of interactions with other firms for the
trades of goods and credits to survive. Financial distress, however, transmits
along the interactions as well. As a firm declines in sales for whatsoever reasons,
bad debts of the firms which sell goods to that firm tend to increase. The firms
have a hard time to manage their financing, also decline, and some of them even
end in bankruptcy. The bad debts increase still more. The risk that financial
distress emerges in a network economy and transmits widely is called systemic
risk in macro-economics. The pattern of interactions has a decisive impact on
both the financial distress and the bankruptcy of firms.
A supply chain and a business cluster are often found highly efficient sub-
systems in a real network economy. A supply chain is a group of firms in a
diverse range of industry sectors. For example, a firm in the finished goods
sector purchases components from a firm in the component sector, and the firm
purchases materials from a firm in the materials sector in turn. As goods are
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moved downstream, money is transferred upstream in the opposite direction.
The topological pattern of these interactions along a stream is a linear chain
most simply. A business cluster is a geographic concentration of firms in closely
related industry sectors. Empirically, firms develop reciprocally profitable inter-
actions with each other, raise each otherfs prosperity collectively, and increase
the productivity as a whole. Win-win games ensue there. The topological pat-
tern of such reciprocal interactions is a ring most simply. Do chain and ring
topologies have any special properties to keep financial distress from emerging
and transmitting? How does the prosperity of individual firms evolve temporar-
ily under such patterns of interactions?
In this study, the transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms is investi-
gated with an abstract stochastic model. The model describes the profit which
firms make when they sell materials to a firm which produces a product, given a
fixed pattern of the network for the trades of goods, and the fixed cost expense
to the firms to produce those materials and product. The mathematical formu-
lae of the model are parallel to those for population dynamics. The prosperity
and the risk of bankruptcy of a firm resemble the population and the risk of
extinction of a species. The analytic solution of the fluctuation is presented
for two building blocks of the entire pattern of interactions, namely, chain and
ring with homogeneous profitability and expense parameters. The fluctuation
and its temporal correlation are analyzed numerically for more general random
pattern of interactions with heterogeneous profitability and expense parameters.
2 Related works
The contagion network model of three industry sectors describes the growth of
firms [Delli Gatti 2010]. The model combines the change in the amount of trades
from firms in the materials industry sector to firms in the finished goods sector,
and the change in the interest rate of loans from banks in the finance sector to
the firms in both industry sectors. The systemic risk emerges from the cycle that
the cumulative loss of firms causes a sharp rise in the interest rate for the firms
to raise funds from banks, and increases the loss still more. When the net worth
of a firm reaches zero by netting the cumulative loss, the firm goes bankrupt.
In the model, the bankrupt firm is replaced with a new firm. The firms and
banks may change selectively the topology of the network for the trades of goods
and credits as the interest rate rises and falls [Delli Gatti 2006]. The price of
the finished goods is a stochastic exogenous variable. A large decline of price
represents the shock which is exerted by a macro-economic environment. The
steady state distribution of the net worth and growth rate of firms is obtained
with simulations. These studies analyze how the avalanche of bankruptcies of
firms ensues from exogenous macro-economic shocks, namely, a sudden fall of
demands and a resulting decline of the price.
Similar contagion network models are applied to analyze the transmission of
distress among banks in an inter-bank credit network [Haldane 2011], [Gai 2010],
[Marte´nez-Jaramillo 2010], [Beyeker 2007]. These studies are of particular inter-
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est worldwide since the recent financial crises. They reveal how the avalanche of
bankruptcies of banks ensues from exogenous macro-economic shocks like a sud-
den decrease of funds transfer requests from client firms, the collapse of an asset
market, and the disappearing liquidity of the assets in which banks make an
investment. None of these studies, however, addresses the problem on how the
probability of the bankruptcy of a firm or a bank, which ignites the avalanche
of bankruptcies, is correlated with endogenous factors like the topology of a
network and the fluctuating trades of goods or credits between them.
In terms of mathematical formulae, the interactions between firms are paral-
lel to the interactions between species in the population dynamics [Allesina 2011],
[Larremore 2011], [Wu 2011], [Mehrotra 2009]. The bankruptcy of a firm when
the prosperity reaches zero resembles the extinction of a species when the pop-
ulation reaches zero. Jain and Krishna’s linear catalytic network is a weighted
digraph whose vertex and arc represent a species and the presence of catalysis
from one species to another [Jain 2001], [Jain 1998]. The weight of an individual
arc is the strength of the catalysis. The steady state distribution of the rela-
tive populations of species is a function of the topology of the digraph. Species
of the smallest population in the steady state are dismissed and replaced by
new species. This results in an update of the topology of the digraph. An
auto-catalytic set appears by chance after an update [Jain 2002a], [Jain 2001b].
It is a set of catalyzed species which governs the proliferation, extinction, and
recovery of the entire system of species. Many real systems, however, do not
reach the steady state quickly, but remain in a transient state. The strength
of the selection pressure on individual species and the resulting probability of
their extinction are not predicted from their relative populations in the steady
state which these studies reveal.
3 Stochastic model
A stochastic model for a network economy is presented in this section. A fixed
digraph represents the entire network economy. The vertex vi is the i-th firm
for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. N is the number of firms. The arc vj → vi represents
the interaction from the vertex vj to vi. An arc vi → vi is a loop.
Continuous variables yi(t) is the prosperity of the i-th firm at continuous
time t. The prosperity is an abstract quantity to represent the net worth, or
the cumulative profit, of the firm. This is parallel to the population of a species
in population dynamics. Assume two types of abstract interactions between
firms. As the j-th firm produces products, its purchase of materials gives rise
to the increase of the prosperities of a set of firms. The rate of change of yi
is given by cijyj(t) where the profitability parameters cij are constant. This
resembles the j-th species (prey) which catalyzes the proliferation of the i-th
species (predators). The non-zero elements of the matrix cij represent the arcs
E = {vj → vi}. The decrease of yi results from the fixed cost expense by
paying for the labor to produce products. The rate is given by −diyi(t) where
the expense parameters di are constant. This resembles the individual deaths
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of the i-th species in the population dynamics.
Stochasticity ensues from an unpredictably irregular temporal pattern of
these interactions. If the probability of an interaction per unit time is constant,
the number of interactions in a given time interval obeys a Poisson distribution
[Komorowski 2011], where the amplitude of deviation is equal to the mean. The
time evolution of yi(t) is given by a system of Langevin equations in eq.(1). The
functional forms of the Gaussian white noises, cξj(t) and
dξi(t), are not known.
dyi(t)
dt
=
N−1∑
j=0
(cijyj(t) +
√
cijyj(t)
cξj(t))− diyi(t)−
√
diyi(t)
dξi(t). (1)
The solutions of eq.(1) are described equivalently by the joint probability
density function P (y, t) of a random variable y = (y0, · · · , yN−1) at t. Its time
evolution is given by a Fokker-Planck equation [Fa 2011], [Dobrinevski 2012] in
eq.(2).
∂P (y, t)
∂t
= −
∑
i
∂
∂yi
AiP (y, t) +
1
2
∑
i,j
∂2
∂yi∂yj
BijP (y, t). (2)
The elements of the drift vector A and the diffusion matrix B is given by
eq.(3) and (4).
Ai =
N−1∑
j=0
A˜ijyj =
N−1∑
j=0
(cij − diδij)yj . (3)
Bij =
N−1∑
k=0
{(cik + diδik)δij +√cikcjk(1− δij)}yk. (4)
4 Analytic solution
A comparative analysis of the impact of topologies on the fluctuation of pros-
perity is presented in this section. The digraph for the entire network economy
includes a number of chain and ring sub-digraphs. A ring sub-graph is the sim-
plest abstract form of collectively reciprocal interactions which are seen in a
business cluster. This is an auto-catalytic set in the population dynamics. A
chain sub-graph represents an abstract supply-chain where reciprocal interac-
tions do not work. The nature of these building blocks is the basis to understand
the impact of the topology of general random digraphs. The formulae for the
fluctuation are derived for these two analytically tractable sub-digraphs with
homogeneous profitability and expense parameters.
The arcs of the chain are EC = {v0 → v1, v1 → v2, · · · , vN−2 → vN−1}.
The vertex v0 is the most downstream purchaser, and vN−1 the most upstream
seller. Assume homogeneous parameters, cij = c ≥ 0 for j = i, cij = c′ > 0 for
j = i−1, cij = 0 for the other values of j, and di = d ≥ 0 for all i. Self-sustaining
profitability, a firm with reciprocal subsidiaries or stably profit-making assets, is
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Table 1: Set Q(i) which gives the bounds of summation with q and q′ for 1µi(t)
in eq.(5).
chain ring
Q(i)
0 ≤ q ≤ i
q′ = i− q
0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1
q′ ≡ i− q mod N
meant when c > 0 (loops {v0 → v0, · · · , vN−1 → vN−1}). This is self-catalysis
in the population dynamics. The arcs of the ring are ER = EC ∪{vN−1 → v0}.
Assume cij = c for j = i, cij = c
′ for j = i − 1%N , cij = 0 for the others. The
modulo operation i− 1%N outputs the remainder on dividing i− 1 by N .
The time evolution of the moments of y is derived from the Fokker-Planck
equation [Maeno 2010], [Maeno 2011]. The first order moments, 1µi(t) = 〈yi〉t,
is the ensemble average of yi at t. The initial condition is
1µi(0) = yi(0). It is
given by a function of t in eq.(5). It increases monotonically if c ≥ d.
1µi(t) = [exp(A˜t)y(0)]i =
∑
Q(i)
yq(0)c
′q′
q′!
tq
′
e(c−d)t. (5)
The bounds of summation with non-negative integer index variables q and q′
are given by the set Q(i) in Table 1. For the ring, q′ is given by a Diophantine
equation q′ ≡ i − q mod N whose solution is q′ = i − q, i − q + N, · · · if i ≥ q,
and q′ = i − q + N, i − q + 2N, · · · if i < q. Significant profitability from the
nearest neighbor firm is ignited when c′t ∼ 1. The ignition time is tp ∼ 1/c′.
The terms of q′ ≥ N represent reciprocal profitability. They are ignited when
(c′t)N/N ! ∼ 1. The ignition time is tr(N) ∼ N/ec′ if N ≫ 1.
The second order moments about the mean (covariance), 2µij(t) = 〈yiyj〉t−
1µi(t)
1µj(t), is given by eq.(6). The initial condition is
2µij(t) = 0. The operand
functions of the three summation operators
∑
are the same.
2µij(t) =
∫ t
0
(exp A˜(t− t′)〈B〉t′ exp A˜T(t− t′))ijdt′
= {(c+ d)
∑
Q1(i,j)
+c′
∑
Q2(i,j)
+
√
cc′
∑
Q3(i,j)∪Q4(i,j)
}
yq(0)c
′q′+q′′+q′′′
q′!q′′!q′′′!
Tq′′,q′+q′′′(t). (6)
The bounds of the
∑
operators with non-negative integer index variables q,
q′, q′′, and q′′′ are given by the sets Q1(i, j) through Q4(i, j) in Table 2. Tr,r′(t)
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Table 2: Sets Q1(i, j) through Q4(i, j) which give the bounds of the
∑
operators
with q, q′, q′′, and q′′′ for 2µij(t) in eq.(6).
chain ring
Q1(i, j)
0 ≤ k ≤ i, j
0 ≤ q ≤ k
q′ = i− k
q′′ = k − q
q′′′ = j − k
0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1
q′ ≡ i − k mod N
q′′ ≡ k − q mod N
q′′′ ≡ j − k mod N
Q2(i, j)
1 ≤ k ≤ i, j
0 ≤ q ≤ k − 1
q′ = i− k
q′′ = k − q − 1
q′′′ = j − k
0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1
q′ ≡ i − k mod N
q′′ ≡ k − q − 1 mod N
q′′′ ≡ j − k mod N
Q3(i, j)
1 ≤ k ≤ i, j + 1
0 ≤ q ≤ k − 1
q′ = i− k
q′′ = k − q − 1
q′′′ = j − k + 1
0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1
q′ ≡ i − k mod N
q′′ ≡ k − q − 1 mod N
q′′′ ≡ j − k + 1 mod N
Q4(i, j)
0 ≤ k ≤ i, j − 1
0 ≤ q ≤ k
q′ = i− k
q′′ = k − q
q′′′ = j − k − 1
0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1
0 ≤ q ≤ N − 1
q′ ≡ i − k mod N
q′′ ≡ k − q mod N
q′′′ ≡ j − k − 1 mod N
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is specified by two non-negative integers r and r′, and given by eq.(7).
Tr,r′(t) =
∫ t
0
t′r(t− t′)r′e(c−d)(2t−t′)dt′
=
r′∑
r′′=0
r′Cr′′(−1)r′−r′′(r + r′ − r′′)!
(c− d)r+r′−r′′+1 t
r′′
× {e2(c−d)t −
r+r′−r′′∑
r′′′=0
(c− d)r′′′tr′′′
r′′′!
e(c−d)t}. (7)
Eq.(5) and (6) hold true for both the chain and ring sub-graphs. The effect
of the reciprocal profitability of a ring appears in the bounds of summation in
Table 1 and 2. The 3rd order moments, 3µijk(t), and higher order moments
are derived similarly. The explicit formula for P (y, t) is obtained by a multi-
variate Edgeworth series [Balitskaya 1988]. The fluctuation is defined by eq.(8).
This quantity is also used in quantifying the noise in a changing environment
[Hilfinger 2011], and the variability of spreading phenomena [Cre´pey 2006].
Fij(t) =
√
2µij(t)
1µi(t)1µj(t)
. (8)
Figure 1 shows Fii(t) for ring and chain sub-graphs as a function of t. For
a ring, c′ > 0 alone does not contain the diverging fluctuation. Fii converges
if c > 0 or d = 0. Downstream vertices (v0 etc.) suffer from larger fluctuation
then upstream vertices (vN−1 etc.) if d > 0. For a ring, the fluctuation in the
transient state is larger than that in the steady state when N ≥ 5.
The limit for the chain is given by eq.(9). It does not depend on any of
i, j, N , c′. For any i, j, the dependence on the initial condition is y0(0)−1/2.
Without self-sustaining profitability, the limit diverges unless the expense for
production is absent. Convergence is slow (∼ t−1), and particularly slow (∼
t−
1
2 ) when c = d = 0. Eq.(9) holds true not only for the linear chain discussed
so far, but for a branching chain. The branching chain is a tree sub-graph
where any vertices neighbor one or more upstream vertices and a downstream
vertex. A tree is such a supply chain in an assembly industry as an electronics
company purchasing from circuit module vendors, each of which purchases from
semiconductor chip makers. The chain and tree sub-graphs look alike because
the growth of prosperity is not influenced by upstream vertices.
lim
t→∞
Fij =


√
1
y0(0)
c+d
c−d c− d > 0
∞ c− d ≤ 0 except c = d = 0
0 c = d = 0
. (9)
The limit for the ring is given by eq.(10). It does not depend on i, j. For
any i, j, the dependence on the initial condition is (
∑
q yq(0))
−1/2. Because
7
Figure 1: Fii(t) as a function of t. (a) chain of N = 30 (i=0 to 29) when c = 2
(self-sustaining profitability), c′ = 1, and d = 1. For all i, yi(0) = 10. (b) chain
when c = 0, c′ = 2, and d = 0 (no expense). Nothing happens for i = 0. (c)
chain when c = 0, c′ = 3, and d = 1. (d) rings of N = 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50,
and 100 when c = 0, c′ = 3, and d = 1.
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the limit in eq.(10) tends to decrease as N increases (N−1/2), the gap between
the limits for the chain and ring is more conspicuous as N increases. As c, c′
decreases or d increases, F increases. Even without self-sustaining profitability,
the limit is finite as far as d < c′ is satisfied.
lim
t→∞
Fij =


√
1∑
q
yq(0)
c+c′+d+2
√
cc′
c+c′−d c− d > −c′
∞ c− d ≤ −c′
. (10)
At small t, Fij is given by eq.(11). The time evolution of Fij for chains is
equal to that of rings of any length with the same parameters. Vertices are
exposed to nearly identical trends of growing fluctuation. None of these sub-
digraphs are discriminated from each other in the digraph with homogeneous
parameters in the early transient state.
Fij ≈
√
t [
{(c+ d)yi(0) + c′yi−1(0)}δij
yi(0)yj(0)
+
√
cc′(yi(0)δi+1 j + yi−1(0)δi−1 j)
yi(0)yj(0)
]−
1
2 .
(11)
5 Numerical analysis
The nature of more general random digraphs is presented in this section. First,
the fluctuation for digraphs with heterogeneous profitability and expense pa-
rameters is analyzed by evaluating the integral in eq.(6) numerically. Fig. 2
shows Fii(t) for a chain, a ring, and a chain of rings when cij is chosen ran-
domly between (1 − h)cˆ and (1 + h)cˆ, given the median cˆ and heterogeneity
parameter h. Given dˆ and yˆ(0), di and yi(0) are chosen randomly in the same
manner.
In (a), most curves for F take a local maximum at about t = tp which
is followed by a few local extrema. The number of the extrema depends on
vertices. The curve for an downstream vertex (with i) along the chain tends
to attract those for its upstream neighbor vertex (with i + 1 etc.). Fll ≤ Fkk
holds true for any l > k at large t. The degenerate limit in eq.(9) is split
into multiple values. The number of the limits depends on the topology and
the value of the parameters. Similar numerical examples show if the chains
without self-sustaining profitability are shorter, the expense starts surpassing
the profitability and an infinitely growing trend of F appears earlier. In (b),
the curves for F for the ring oscillate regularly after about t = tr. Crests
and troughs of the profitability arise locally, and transmit along the ring as a
travelling wave. This profit-making wave does not impair the convergence to
the single limit. Generally, if the rings are shorter, the reciprocal profitability is
ignited and F starts converging earlier. In (c), the fluctuation resembles that for
the chain, but the number of limits tends to be smaller. The swinging changes
in F at about t = tp until about t = tr represent the transient state from the
common initial growth to the final steady state.
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Figure 2: Fii(t) for i = 0 to 29 (N = 30) as a function of t when cij , di, and
yi(0) are chosen randomly. (a) Chain with cˆ = 2 for j = i (self-sustaining
profitability), 1 for j = i − 1, and 0 for the other j. (b) Ring with cˆ = 3 for
j = i− 1%N and 0 for the other j. (c) Chain of rings whose topology is shown
in (d) with cˆ = 3 if an arc is present and 0 otherwise. For the all graphs, dˆ = 1,
yˆ(0) = 10, and h = 0.5.
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Next, the dependence of the transient state on the number of arcs and
rewiring of random digraphs, and on the heterogeneity of profitability and ex-
pense parameters is investigated with the temporal correlation of Fii(t). The
correlation is the Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient of F between
the inception of growth at t1 = 0.01 and t. It is defined by eq.(12). F¯ (t) is the
average of Fii over the all vertices at t.
R(t) =
∑
i(Fii(t)− F¯ (t))(Fii(t1)− F¯ (t1))√∑
i(Fii(t)− F¯ (t))2
∑
i(Fii(t1)− F¯ (t1))2
. (12)
Fig. 3 shows R(t). The curves are the average over many different digraphs
with the same number of arcs, rewiring, and heterogeneity of parameters. The
graph gives the general tendency of the fluctuation as a function of K and pr
given h. A digraph is specified by K and pr. K is the out-degree of vertices
which is the average over the all vertices. Sparse digraphs have a small value
of K. Some of the arcs are chosen at the rewiring probability of pr. Either end
of the chosen arcs is rewired to a different vertex. The figure shows the curves
for rings with pr = 0, 0.01, 0.1, and 1, namely, random digraphs in the Watts-
Strogatz model [Watts 1998], and chains with pr = 0. The Watts-Strogatz
model describes the small-world property of digraphs. The rings with pr = 1
are equivalent to random digraphs in the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model [Erdo¨s 1959]. In
the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, an arc is set between each pair of vertices with equal
probability, independently of the other arcs.
In (a), the sign of R turns about sharply after the ignition of profitability.
For the rings with small pr, the initial correlation (R ∼ 1) is followed by moder-
ate anti-correlation (R > −0.5), which disappears as the reciprocal profitability
takes over the role to govern F from the profitability and expense. The anti-
correlation decreases only very slowly for the rings with pr = 1 where rewiring
destroys collectively reciprocal interactions. Strong anti-correlation (R ∼ −1)
appears for the chains where the profitability and expense keep on working for
ever. Both the profitability and expense cause anti-correlation, and the anti-
correlation is a potential indicator of the transient state. The reason for these
is as follows. Initially, a small prosperity means relatively large fluctuation be-
cause of the factor
√
(dyi(0) + c′yi−1(0))/yi(0) in eq.(11) when c = 0. After
the ignition of the profitability, it mitigates large F for the vertex having small
y(0). The expense pressures small F for the vertex having large y(0) into rising.
So the anti-correlation appears. At the same time, they tend to compete with
each other in forcing the absolute value of the individual Fii to decrease or in-
crease. In (b), anti-correlation disappears gradually as a result of self-sustaining
profitability for the chains. This effect is not evident for the rings.
In (c) and (d), if the value of K increases, the value of pr increases, or the
value of h decreases, the sign of R turns about earlier and subsequent anti-
correlation becomes stronger except the case of large K and large h where the
anti-correlation nealy vanishes and the correlation converges almost monoton-
ically. The time when the correlation converges also depends on them. If the
value of K increases, the value of pr decreases, or the value of h increases, the
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Figure 3: R(t) as a function of t for random digraphs of N = 100. (a) K = 2
and h = 0.05 with cˆ = 3 if an arc is present and 0 otherwise. (b) K = 2 and
h = 0.05 with cˆ = 2 for j = i (self-sustaining profitability), 1 if an arc is present
and 0 otherwise. (c) Ring of K = 5 and 20 with cˆ = 3 if an arc is present and 0
otherwise. (d) Ring of K = 5 and 20 with cˆ = 2 for j = i, 1 if an arc is present
and 0 otherwise. For the all graphs, dˆ = 1 and yˆ(0) = 10. The rings with pr = 1
are Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random digraphs. 12
Figure 4: Time constants ta and tc for rings of N = 100 with cˆ = 3 if an arc is
present and 0 otherwise, dˆ = 1, and yˆ(0) = 10. (a) ta as a function of K and h,
pr = 1. (b) ta as a function of pr and h, K = 5. (c) tc as a function of K and
h, pr = 1. (d) tc as a function of pr and h, K = 5.
correlation disappears earlier. Such nature of the time evolution of the corre-
lation is demonstrated by the graphs in Figure 3, which show time constants
as a function of K, h, and pr. The time when the anti-correlation appears is
given by ta = inf{t > 0, R(t) < 0}. The relaxation time for the convergence
is defined in this study by tc = sup{t > ta, |R(t)| > 0.2}. The convergence
of the correlation is slow for digraphs with small K and large pr. The fluc-
tuation for sparse random digraphs undergoes an upheaval in the salient and
long-lived transient state because of the absence of collectively reciprocal inter-
actions. When pr = 1, the probability at which at least one path starting from
a vertex forms a ring sub-digraph of length L (< logK N) is given roughly by
pa(L) ≈ 1 − {(N − 2)/(N − 1)}KL if N ≫ 1. When N = 100 and K = 2,
pa(2) ≈ 0.04. Ring sub-digraphs are missing in the digraph. When K = 5,
pa(2) ≈ 0.22. Ring sub-digraphs appear. When K = 20, pa(2) ≈ 0.98. Most
vertices in the digraph are vertices of ring sub-digraphs. If K is larger, shorter
ring sub-digraphs appear more and the convergence of F starts earlier.
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6 Discussion
The fluctuation does not converge to the limit monotonically. If a firm is a
more downstream purchaser (with smaller i) along a supply-chain, the expense
starts surpassing the profitability there earlier. The supply-chain would not be
stable for ever without self-sustaining profitability. This means that there is a
finite life time for supply-chains. If the business cluster to which a firm belongs
is smaller, the reciprocal profitability is ignited earlier. Just the presence of a
business cluster does not predict correctly the risk of impending bankruptcy of
individual firms in the transient state. A number of such building blocks are
inter-connected with each other to form a general digraph for the entire net-
work economy of firms. The time when the fluctuation converges depends on
the sparseness of the general digraph. The swinging changes in F are the conse-
quence of a topology-dependent time trial competition between the profitability
and expense.
No doubt it is a rational strategy to survive in the long run for any firms to
occupy a position in a predominant business cluster with reciprocal interactions,
say, an intersection of multiple long ring sub-digraphs in the digraph of the entire
network economy. But in practice, every time the firms settle accounts, their
prosperity must be positive. The selection pressure is brought on the firms
nearly continuously if the time interval between their successive settlements
is short. Even if a business cluster is present topologically, it may not take
effects, nor will it start working soon. The firms must comprehend the time
trial competition between the profitability and expense, and determine whether
they remain at the current position or bet on the success of rewiring to push
back against the immediate selection pressure.
The bankruptcy of a firm ensues directly from an instantaneous fluctuation.
It is not within the scope of this study to solve the problem of a first passage time
with reflective boundary conditions at yi = 0, but qualitatively, the bankruptcy
of the i-th firm is more probable as Fii increases. If P (y, t) is approximately
a multi-variate normal distribution, the rough estimate of the probability of
bankruptcy at t is pb(t) ∼
∫ 0
−∞ PM(yi, t)dyi = Φ(−1/Fii(t)) where PM is a
marginal distribution of P and Φ is the cumulative density function of a normal
distribution. F in the transient state often exceeds the limit of F . The small
value of the limit of Fii does not mean the certainty of the survival of the i-th
firm until then. Some firms are more likely to go bankrupt than expected from
the fluctuation in the steady state, and consequently, there is a risk of failing
to reach by far the less fluctuating steady state. The risk is more significant in
sparse random digraphs.
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